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The academic debate about the desirability of prohibiting 
insider trading is longstanding and as yet unresolved. Until 
Henry Manne’s 1966 book, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 
the debate centered on whether insider trading is unfair 
to public investors who are not privy to private corporate 
information. However, the fairness approach is malleable and 
indeterminate and thus does not lend itself to clear-cut policy 
prescriptions. Since Manne’s book, the focus of the debate has 
been on the effect of insider trading on economic efficiency. 
Manne argued that, contrary to the prevailing legal and moral 
opinion of the time, insider trading is desirable because it is 
economically efficient and thus ought not to be regulated. In 
contrast, Manne’s critics argue that insider trading is inefficient 
and thus ought to be regulated.
In brief, legal scholars who believe that insider trading is 
efficient and thus ought not to be prohibited maintain that 
insider trading increases managers’ (and other insiders’) 
incentives to behave in the interest of stockholders; makes stock 
prices more informationally efficient (that is, more accurate); 
and/or does not decrease the liquidity of the stock market. In 
contrast, legal scholars who believe that insider trading is ineffi-
cient and thus ought to be prohibited argue that insider trading 
reduces managers’ (and other insiders’) incentives to behave in 
the interest of stockholders; makes stock prices less informa-
tionally efficient (that is, less accurate); and/or decreases stock 
market liquidity.
The legal academic literature on insider trading suffers from 
a few significant shortcomings. One problem with this literature 
is that the scholarly debate fails to identify a specific efficiency 
locus. The academic inquiry varies from examinations of the 
narrow effects of insider trading on efficiency at the firm level 
(so-called agency theories of insider trading) to work studying 
the broader effects of insider trading on stock market efficiency 
(so-called market theories of insider trading). It is possible, 
however, that insider trading may enhance efficiency within the 
firm, but that markets in which insider trading is permitted are 
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thereby less efficient in the aggregate. Researchers who focus 
their studies at different levels and report different results could 
be talking past each other.
A second, major shortcoming of the law and economics liter-
ature on insider trading is that it is insufficiently grounded in 
empirical evidence. Beginning with Manne’s seminal argument, 
legal academic scholarship on insider trading has been largely 
speculative and theoretical. Moreover, few scholars sought to 
examine the impact of insider trading rules in a comparative 
context. However, without variation in insider trading rules 
and enforcement, one cannot test causal hypotheses about the 
effects of such rules and their enforcement.
Summary of empirical findings
In contrast to most of the existing legal scholarship on 
insider trading, my research is empirical and comparative. In 
the study “Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World,” 
which I summarize in this brief written testimony, I investigate 
whether insider trading laws and enforcement are systemati-
cally related to stock market performance across countries. I 
formulate three testable hypotheses, which are that countries 
with more stringent insider trading laws have (a) more wide-
spread equity ownership; (b) more informative stock prices; 
and (c) more liquid stock markets, other things, including 
enforcement history and potential, equal. To test these hypoth-
eses, I constructed an index of the stringency of insider trading 
laws for 33 countries as of the mid-1990s.
Figure 2 illustrates that the countries with more stringent 
insider trading laws also tend to have more informative stock 
prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity. (Stock 
price synchronicity is a measure of the degree to which the 
stock prices of different firms move together, with greater 
co-movement suggesting that stock prices are less informative 
about firm-specific information).
Finally, Figure 3 shows that the countries with more 
stringent insider trading laws tend to have greater average stock 
market turnover (a measure of stock market liquidity) than 
countries with less stringent insider trading laws.
I confirm these patterns when I conduct multivariable 
regression analysis to control for other factors, including past 
enforcement history and enforcement potential. Furthermore, 
my regressions strongly suggest that the possibility of stringent 
criminal or monetary sanctions, rather than the breadth of the insider 
trading prohibition, is the more salient feature of countries’ insider 
trading laws. Criminal and civil sanctions are more frequently 
significant than the scope of the insider trading prohibition in 
the regressions that I report in the article. Stringent  
public enforcement also seems to be more important than 
private enforcement.
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Using simple correlations and multivariable regression 
analysis, I find that countries with more stringent insider 
trading laws have more dispersed equity ownership; more liquid 
stock markets; and more informative stock prices, consistent 
with the formulated hypotheses. The following three figures, 
excerpted from my study “Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets,” 
Figure 1: Average Ownership Concentration Plotted Against  
Insider Trading Law Index
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Figure 2: Average Stock Price Synchronicity Plotted
Against Insider Trading Law Index
demonstrate these findings visually. Figure 1 shows that the 
countries in my sample that have more stringent insider trading 
laws tend to have lower average equity ownership concentra-
tion (that is, more dispersed share ownership) among their 10 
largest non-financial firms, where ownership concentration 
is measured as the equity ownership stake of the three largest 
shareholders in the 10 largest private non-financial firms in  
an economy.
Figure 3: Average Stock Market Turnover/Liquidity  
(1991-1995) Plotted Against Insider Trading Law Index
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Implications of empirical research for the U.S. insider 
trading debate
My results are consistent with (but do not prove) the 
claim that insider trading laws have a positive impact on stock 
markets. More liquid stock markets and more accurate stock 
prices reduce the overall cost of equity capital and improve 
the efficiency of capital allocation, respectively. Private 
parties would be unlikely to give adequate consideration to 
these external benefits, if insider trading were left to private 
contracting (that is, if firms and shareholders were permitted 
to set the firm’s insider trading policy in place of insider trading 
regulation). My findings thus support the case for public regula-
tion and correspondingly weaken the case for deregulation of 
insider trading. Furthermore, to the extent that insider trading 
regulation encourages more accurate stock prices and greater 
stock market liquidity, regulation might indirectly ameliorate 
corporate agency problems, as more accurate stock prices 
and greater liquidity facilitate improved corporate governance 
and the market for corporate control. The United States has 
the most stringent insider trading rules and enforcement in 
the world and recent empirical evidence, including my own, 
suggests that this might be at least one reason why investor 
confidence is greater in our stock markets than in many 
other stock markets of the world. If insider trading laws are 
detrimental, as Professor Manne and others have posited, the 
patterns I find would have been unlikely.
It is premature, however, to claim that the debate between 
proponents and opponents of insider trading laws has now been 
empirically resolved. My results must be viewed cautiously 
for several reasons. One reason for caution is the crude nature 
of the available variables and the small sample of available 
countries. It is some consolation that these limitations might be 
expected to reduce the likelihood of finding significant relation-
ships, but they nonetheless suggest a need for cautious interpre-
tation. Finally, although my empirical results show a significant 
relationship between insider trading laws and various measures 
of stock market performance, they do not prove causality.
The appropriate conclusion to reach from this research is not 
that the arguments of proponents of insider trading regulation 
have been proven to be sounder than the arguments of those 
who criticize such regulation, but rather that there is greater 
reason to believe in their soundness than there was before this 
study was conducted. If insider trading laws are detrimental, as 
Professor Manne and others have suggested, the patterns I find 
would have been improbable. 
Further empirical research on  this issue is warranted, such 
as the assembly of more adequate cross-sectional data from a 
broader range of countries and over a longer range of time. My 
research is but a first step. It can help to resolve the theoretical 
conflict (and perhaps contribute to the articulation of a more 
coherent insider trading legal doctrine and policy in the United 
States) only if consistent empirical work follows.
